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Introduction

,

In this essay I critically examine the views of Tristram Engelhardt, Jr.

on the euthanasia of defective infants. Engelhardt offers two
approaches to the problem, which he presents as complementary. I
will argue that not only are the two approaches not complementary,
they are even inconsistent with each other.
Further, I will compare Engelhardt's views on the euthanasia of
defective newborns with those he expresses elsewhere on the issue of
abOl;tion. I intend to argue that the positions he takes in the latter
essay are not entirely consistent with those he takes in the former, and
that both are dubious.

In his essay, "Ethical Issues in Aiding the Death of Young Children ," H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. attempts to clarify the issue of
euthanasia involving defective infants.! Engelhardt argues that some
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sort of euthanasia is permissible, and in some cases possibly mandatory, as a result of the following considerations. First, it is not clear
that even normal small children are persons in the sense that adults are
persons. Adults "belong" to themselves in the sense that they are
"rational and free and therefore responsible for their actions." 2
Young children, on the other hand, are neither self-possessed nor
responsible. While adults exist in and for themselves as self-directive
and self-conscious beings, young children exist for their families and
those who love them. Young children cannot in any sense be responsible for themselves, so if being a person is to be a bearer of rights and
duties, young children are not persons in a strict sense.3 Small children have no self-defined identity. They are, rather, defined by their
social role - for example, mother-child, family-child. They live as
persons in and through the care of those who are responsible for them
until they can develop to the point where they can define their own
role in society.
Though newborn infants are not persons in a strict sense, they are
valued highly because they have the potential to become persons in
the strict sense. The rights and duties of the child are held "in trust"
by others for a future time when they become "full-fledged
persons." 4 Defective newborns constitute a problematic case because
not only are they not persons in a strict sense, but also because their
likelihood for living a fully developed human life is very uncertain.
Because of the remoteness of defective infants from full-fledged
personhood, Engelhardt claims that it is permissible to euthanize a
defective newborn in these cases where the prospects for a decent life
are small and the prospective cost to the family in terms of money and
anxiety is high.5 He claims that the decisions on these matters properly lie in the hands of the parents because "it is primarily in terms of
the family that children exist and develop - until children become
persons strictly, they are persons in virtue of their social roles." 6 As a
precaution, Engelhardt stipulates that society has a right to intervene
and protect children whenever caring for them does not constitute a
severe burden and when it is likely the child could be brought up to
enjoy a good quality of life. 7
It could be questioned, however, whether or not Engelhardt has
provided sufficient protection for the interests of severely defective
newborns. If they are truly defective, and their treatment is indeed a
burden to the parents, the decision would be left entirely to the
parents. Shouldn't there be some procedure whereby some representative of society's interest in the protection of life can intervene in case
the parents' decision is questionable? On this issue, Engelhardt stipulates that
As long as parents do not unjustifiably neglect the humans in these roles so
that the value and purpose of that role (that is, child) stands to be eroded
(thus endangering other children), society need not intervene.
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and also that
Society must value mother-child and family-child relationships and should
intervene only in cases where 1) neglect is unreasonable and thereby would
undermine respect and care for children, or 2) where societal intervention
would prevent children from suffering unnecessary pain. 8

Engelhardt's reference to the possibility of "unreasonable neglect" is
revealing. This suggests that neglect could at times be "reasonable." It
is likely, however, that neglect is by definition unreasonable. (For this
point as well as many others, I am indebted to my colleague, Prof.
John Donnelly, I would also like to thank my colleague, Prof.
Dennis Rohatyn, for many useful comments.) Engelhardt might reply
that this dispute is merely terminological, that he is simply referring to
the nontreatment of defective infants. It is not clear that the difficulty
can be resolved so easily, however. Generally, nontreatment of an ill
patient is based on the grounds that it is in the patient's own interest
to withhold treatment. Since that appears to be untrue in the cases
with which Engelhardt is concerned, it remains unclear how failure to
administer treatment can be rationalized.
Possibility of Abuse
Engelhardt's remarks concerning the possible abuse of defective
infants are troublesome in other respects as well. By linking societal
intervention to the erosion of respect for other children, Engelhardt
may be setting the stage for at least sporadic instances of abuse. If the
abuse of defective infants is sufficiently infrequent so as not to lead to
an erosion of respect for other children, such abuse on Engelhardt's
analysis may be not so much unfortunate, though unavoidable, as it is
permissible. Further, it is not at all clear that the mistreatment or
automatic euthanasia of defective infants would undermine respect
for children in general; only similarly defective children would be
endangered by the spread of a practice that Engelhardt advocates. It
will be recalled that normal children have rights in virtue of the fact
that they possess what the defective child lacks, namely the potential
to develop into a person in the "strict" sense. In Engelhardt's schema,
normal children are valued in terms of their potential to be persons in
the "strict" sense and hence, once this fact is emphasized, the automatic euthanasia of less significant entities - severe'ly defective
infants - cannot be expected to erode that role. Indeed, Engelhardt's
analysis is paradoxical in that the more morally questionable the
decision is to allow an ihfant to die, the less likely it is to erode the
safety of normal children. Assuming that the majority of persons
would find that allowing, for instance, that the immediate euthanasia
of mongoloid newborns is abhorrent, this would help guarantee that
such actions are permissible if done only by the parents of mongoloid
infants. This is because the majority would not act this way and would
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be horrified by the practice. Such an attitude on the part of parents of
normal children would, therefore, ensure the safety of normal children.
It is also unclear whether the second type of situation, when intervention is permissible, actually protects the defective infant. First,
intervening only to prevent unnecessary pain would seem, in this context, to allow intervention most often to cause death, rarely to
prevent it. What constitutes unnecessary suffering, moreover, is at
least in part determined by the status of the infant. If the defective
infant does not possess the feature that entitles normal children to
rights, almost any suffering could be considered "unnecessary." If,
however, a child is normal or has a reasonable chance of undergoing
normal development, he at once has rights and a promising future, and
any suffering which present treatment causes would have to be considered "necessary," i.e., justifiable. It could be, therefore, that Engelhardt's reference to preventing "unnecessary" pain in effect merely
reflects the original ontological distinction between normal and defective infants. As such, it is not clear how it could be expected to
operate successfully to hinder possible abuses of defective infants
inspired by that distinction.
Thus Engelhardt's limiting principles do little to defeat the parental
abuse allowed by his analysis of defective infants. Moreover, Engelhardt's analysis is questionable in that defective infants need not be
dependent upon their parents for financial and emotional support.
There are many organizations affiliated with institutions such as the
Catholic Church which routinely take custody of defective infants.
Thus the number of possible persons and groups from which the
infant could receive support is significantly greater than Engelhardt
allows. The parents of defective infants should only be allowed to
decide their children's fate if no other agency or person is able to
tender support to the children. The number of infants vyho cannot be
saved in this manner would then presumably be reduced, if not
eliminated.
Engelhardt's analysis can also be questioned in light of an earlier
discussion of abortion. In his article, "The Ontology of Abortion,"
Engelhardt claims that the potentiality of the fetus to become a fullfledged person is not sufficient to confer on it any significant rights. 9
Certainly not until it has reached the stage of viability can it be
considered to have a right to life. 1o Engelhardt allows that if a stringent definition of a " person" is accepted , there would be prima facie
reasons for permitting not only the abortion of viable fetuses, but
infanticide as well. This result need not obtain, according to Engelhardt, for although in early infancy a human person is not actually
present, nonetheless
the child is appreci ated sociall y as a n individual to whom o ne has act ual
- not pote ntial - obligations in a fashion quite d ifferent from the fe tus in
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the mother-fetus relationship. The newborn infant, unlike the fetus, can
elicit a series of regular responses and activities from rational humans even
though the infant is not itself rational. Even within primitive social contexts, its crying appears as a demand for food, etc., and initiates a series of
activities directed to the infant as if it were a person. 11

It should first be noted that in this essay, Engelhardt argues that the
potential to be a person in the "strict" sense is not morally significant.
But if not, then the feature which distinguishes a defective from a
normal infant in Engelhardt's later essay must be suspect. It would
seem that either the distinction in terms of rights between normal and
defective infants would have to be abandoned, or the contention that
the potential of the fetus to become a person in the " strict" sense is
morally significant.

Engelhardt's Reasoning
The reason Engelhardt advances for claiming that infanticide iS
impermissible deserves close scrutiny. Newborns and viable fetuses,
though not rational, possess the property of being appreciated as
beings whose needs or demands should presumably be honored. If so,
then while abortion of nonviable fetuses may be permissible, infanticide, like abortion of possibly viable fetuses, is not. Unfortunately, if
despite being in a nonrational state, the ability to be perceived as
having needs is sufficient for ensuring a right to life, then surely
defective infants would have at least as much claim to that right as
normal infants. Defective infants are often even more dependent upon
others than normal infants. All that seems to be needed is that some
rational others perceive the expression of·a need as a demand worthy
of being honored. Indeed it seems that the criteria for ascribing rights
Engelhardt introduces in this earlier essay are quite disparate from
those proferred in the later essay. The criteria introduced in the earlier
essay imply that entities which are not persons in the "strict" sense
may nonetheless have rights if rational others can see them as persons.
In the later essay, defective infants simply do not have rights because
they are neither persons in the strict sense nor have the potential to
become such. If, in accordance with the earlier criteria, defective
infants were considered by a majority of persons to be persons, they
would presumably possess a right to life. If so, then abuse of them
would seem to be impermissible even if it did not lead to the abuse of
other children, just as isolated abuse of normal children would be
impermissible.
Engelhardt claims that the mother-fetus relationship is primarily
biological and occurs automatically, without active involvement of the
mother. The mother-child relationship is, however, active and
explicitly social. The difference lies
in the social schema, the well developed social role "child" in which the
infant can be acted upon as if it were a person and in which it acts back. 12
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In claiming that the infant "acts back" presumably "as if it were a
person," Engelhardt must be speaking metaphorically. He has previously stated that they are not strictly persons but merely have the
potential for becoming such. Thus they do not have the capacity for
intentional action that normal adults possess. Infants, both defective
and normal, would then seem to merely react to stimuli and to
instinctively express their needs. Neither the healthy infant nor the
defective one would seem to "act" (back) in the sense of intentional
action. 13 What then could be the possible basis for seeing the infant as
if it were a person who can act and be acted upon? Presumably Engelhardt holds that within the social context of medicine it is true that
infants are treated as if they were persons even though their continued
healthy existence is not guaranteed. Fetal development on the other
hand is automatic, and the fetus cannot be seen as a separate patient.
The above line of argument was rendered permanently irrelevant,
however, almost before Engelhardt's essay appeared. With techniques
such as ultrasound, amniocentesis, etc., the condition of the fetus as a
separate patient can be ascertained. Moreover, as the following actual
case shows, the fetus can be the object of therapy in utero. Recently,
a young fetus was diagnosed as suffering from hydronephrosis, a
disorder of the urinary tract which can lead to kidney destruction. 14
Physicians waited until the seventh month of fetal development and
then took steps to irrigate the fetal bladder, which abated the condition until the infant could be operated on after birth. As the physicians involved in the case put it, "We can now treat the fetus as a
patient." Indeed, the National Commission for the Protection of the
Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research states that the
fetus is a human subject who is deserving of care and respect. Their
guidelines regarding therapeutic research directed toward the fetus
include the following stipulation in such research:
The fetal su bject is selected on the basis of its health condition, benefits and
risks accrue to that fetus, and proxy consent is directed toward that
subject's own welfare. Hence, with adequate review to assess scientific
merit, prior r esearch, the balance of risks and benefits, and the su fficiency
of the consent process, such research conforms with all relevant principles
and is both ethically acceptable and laudable . . .. 15

Thus the concept of the fetus as a patient has been an integral part of
medical policy since at least 1975.
On Engelhardt's analysis, it seems that fetuses can qualify as
patients since they can be 1) the subject of therapy and 2) legitimately
seen as persons. One distinction (according to Engelhardt) between
newborns and fetuses is that the development of the fetus is automatic
and requires no intervention by others. It seems, however, that only
the development of the normal fetus will be automatic, i.e., such that
it does not call for medical intervention. Contrast the gestating defec·
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tive infant who calls for the application of therapeutic techniques, as
in the example cited. Here again, it would seem that on Engelhardt's
criteria the defective human would have more claim to rights than
could the normal human. But surely this is odd, at least on Engelhardt's professed terms.
II

In any case, Engelhardt discusses a second important aspect of the
euthanasia of defective infants. Suppose the defective infant has a
right not to have its life prolonged. 16 It could be that to such an
individual its continued existence is an evil, not a good. The legal
embodiment of this (moral) concept is the proposed legal notion of
"wrongful life." Engelhardt notes that a number of suits have been
initiated in the United States and other countries claiming that life or
existence is a tort or injury to the living person. The concept of
wrongful life presupposes that nonexistence is preferable to life and
that arriving at such judgments is reasonable in specific cases. Engelhardt claims that the concept of tort for wrongful life is transferable,
in part, to the
... painfully compromised existence of children who can only have their
life prolonged for a short, painful, and marginal existence. The concept
suggests that allowing life to be prolonged under such circumstances would
itself be an injury to the person whose painful and severely compromised
existence would be made to continue .... 17

Engelhardt argues that there may be a duty not to prolong life whenever it can be determined to have a substantial negative value for the
person involved. 18
Engelhardt explicates these two approaches to the problem of
defective newborns as if they were complementary or at least compatible. It seems, however, that the two approaches are not only not
complementary, but indeed inconsistent. To the extent that one
approach to the problem is adopted, the other must be abandoned. It
will be recalled that the reason Engelhardt adduces for claiming that
the euthanasia of defective newborns should be left to the parents is
that they (newborns) have no "self-defining" identity of their own.
Small children have only a social identity until they develop the characteristics of autonomy, and hence acquire rights and responsibilities.
Until that time, the rights of normal infants are held in trust. Respect
for the time when the infant will attain the status of a normal adult is
what enjoins us to value infants highly. The case is different for defective newborns. They possess merely a social identity, i.e., that of
"child." Moreover, their social identity must include the fact that they
are a defective token of that type. They do not possess the characteristic which Engelhardt claims commands our moral deference - the
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potential to develop into a normal adult, who is a person in the
"strict" sense. This being the case, the parents, whom the small child
"lives through" and who give it sustenance, can determine its fate as it
apparently has no rights of its own. Unfortunately, if defective newborns only possess an identity through their social role and do not
command respect in virtue of their potential to develop into a person
in the "strict" sense, it is not clear how their interest could be represented in a civil injury suit. In a tort, reference is made to the damage
to interests of "persons." The archetypical participant in such
litigation is a person in "strict" sense. However, the interests of incompetent persons are protected in civil matters by a legal principle
known as the "principle of substituted judgment" which allows for
proxy consent on behalf of the incompetent. An attempt is made to
"don the mantle of the incompetent" and choose what he or she
would want if he or she were competent.1 9 In this way the particularly human characteristic of rational choice is extended to the
incompetent, and respect for the inherent human dignity of the
incompetent is sustained.
Allusion to Wrongful Life Suits
To make the allusion to suits for wrongful life (or the wrong of
continued existence) on behalf of the defective infant is to imply that
the infant has the rights of other citizens. If, however, the application
of civil law to cases involving defective newborns presupposes that the
victim has the status of a person, difficulties arise with regard to
Engelhardt's first approach to the problem. To leave the decision to
the parents, and to allow financial and emotional burdens to be determining factors does not accord well with the legal concept that the
interests of a defective newborn are on a par with those of other
individuals who are persons in a strict sense. If Engelhardt's first
approach is adopted, and the legal fact that incompetents have standing equal to that of normal persons is recognized, the following absurd
result is implied: anytime any person whose existence depends upon
others becomes an emotional or financial burden, he can be killed or
allowed to die. This result would obtain because leaving the decision
to aid the death of defective infants up to the parents was based in
large part upon the fact that the infants have no rights of their own;
they live only through their parents. Once these infants are presumed
to have the status of other persons, the parental sovereignty Engelhardt grants on the first approach appears excessive.
If, on the other hand, Engelhardt's first approach is abandoned in
light of these considerations, treatment of defective newborns will, in
some cases, take a different course. If the newborn is seen as having
the same basic right to life as normal adult persons, emphasis will be
May, 1983
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placed upon what is in its best interests, not someone else's. Hence,
factors such as parental anguish and financial burden would correspondingly diminish in importance. Otherwise, we are forced to
condone the possibility that the life of the infant may be sacrificed for
the benefit of others. 20 If we acknowledge the defective newborn's
interests as being as legitimate as the interests of other persons, we can
then justify making the effort to secure conditions favorable to their
existence even under physically, emotionally, or economically adverse
circumstances. All that is required is that the infant be delivered from
incessant pain; it need not be relieved of pain altogether. After all, no
persons have an existence entirely free of pain. 21 Indeed, some otherwise normal individuals suffer from constant or chronic pain and yet
we do not therefore contend that they have less of a right to live. The
fact that the defective may never possess the characteristics which
Engelhardt claims entitle it to personhood in the "strict" sense is
insignificant once we adopt the legal viewpoint. For as long as a
reasonable lifeplan can be realized for the incompetent, that is all that
is needed. By means of the principle of substituted judgment, the
probable wishes of the incompetent can be ascertained. These preferences necessarily differ from those of other persons, but this does not
imply either that their satisfaction is not important to the incompetent or that they are less worthy of being satisfied.
On the other hand, if Engelhardt's first approach is adopted, defective infants are neither persons in the "strict" sense nor do they have
the characteristic which would confer such status on them. Hence, it is
difficult to see how they could be represented in civil litigation or, for
that matter, have any of their rights violated by continued existence.
As a cop.sequence, no strong moral duty could be ascribed to the
physician to terminate or not treat a defective infant. This is for two
reasons: 1) only persons are due serious moral consideration, and
2) physicians qua physicians are charged with the medical treatment
of persons. Therefore, Engelhardt's second approach is simply
inapplicable. Engelhardt's analysis puts the defective infant in a
catch-22 situation. For the purpose of allowing those to whom it is a
burden to decide whether to euthanize it, it has no serious rights of its
own. For the purpose of deciding what is best for the infant, it has the
rights of a person insofar as it can, through proxy consent, demand its
own death.
The discussion in this section points inescapably to the conclusion
that extreme caution is needed in deciding the issue of whether to
treat defective infants. There is the danger of misguidedly elevating
their status in order to claim that the infant has a right to die. When
this is done, it becomes imperative to realize that by parity of reasoning the infant has the same right to life as any normal adult. In that
case, it seems that Engelhardt has misguidedly argued for an effect
opposite to that for which he argued in his first approach.

180

Linacre Quarterly

REFERENCES
1. The first essay appeared in Beneficent Euthanasia, ed. by Marvin Kohl
(Prometheus Books, 1975). It was reprinted in Biomedical Ethics, ed. by T .
Mappes and J. Z embaty (McGraw-Hill, 1981), pp . 384-391. The references in this
essay will refer to the latter vohl m e.
2. Ibid., p . 386.

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Lac. cit.
Lac. cit.
Lac. cit.
Ibid., p. 387.
Lac. cit.
Lac. cit.

9. His essay appears in Ethics, vol. 84, no. 3 (April, 1974), pp. 217 -234.

10. Ibid. , pp. 230-232.
11. Ibid., p. 231.
12. Lac. cit.
13. Prof. Ramsey has pointed out to me that Engelhardt needs to justify his
apparent presupposition that "acting back" confers moral status. In one sense, on
Engelhardt's own terms, neither h ealthy nor defective infants can" act" in the
sense that adults can; in another sense, they can "react" to stimuli just because
they are alive. Whatever sense is given to "acting" back by Engelhardt, one cannot
h elp but wonder if it puts into qu estion the personhood of persons in possibly
lengthy comas, paralyzed persons, etc.
14. Reported in Newsweek, Aug. 10, 1981. Even more recently, a two-month
old fetus was removed from the womb, operated on and placed back into the
womb to con ti nue its development. Though the fetus ultimately di ed from other
causes, the operation was successful.
15. Cf. R eport and R ecommendations: R esearch on the Fetus (1975), DHEW
publication no. (05) 76-127.
16. Engelhardt, H. Tristram, Jr., "Ethical Issues in Aiding the Death of Young
Children," Biomedical Ethics, ed . by Thomas A. Mappes and Jane S. Z embaty
(McGraw-Hili, 1981).
17. Ibid. , p . 388.
18. Lac. cit. Professor Ramsey has pointed out to me that the concepts of th e
"wrong of continued existence" and of "wrongful life" (i .e, wrongful conception) are not identical. Only "wrongful birth" may be viewed as an instance of the
wrong of continued existence.
19. Cf. John A. R o bertson, " Organ Donations by Incompetents and the Substituted Judgment Doctrine," Columbia Law Re view, vol. LXXVI , 1976, pp . 48-78;
Gary E. Jones, " On the Saikewicz Dec ision," read at the Western Division Meeting
of the American Philosophical Association, April, 1980, as well as at the Sec ond
Annual Conference for Applied Philosophy at Bowling Green University, May,
1980; Paul Ramsey , Ethics at th e Edges of Life (Yale University Pr ess, 197 8), pp.
238 ff.
20. Cf. John A. Robertson, "Involuntary Euthanasia of Defective N ewborns, "
Stanford Law Review, vol. 27, Jan., 1975, pp. 213,214, 251-261.
21. If this criterion were adhered to, the number of cases of permissible
eu thanasia would greatly diminish . Cf. Robertson, " Involuntary Euthanasia of
Defective Newborns," pp. 253 ff.

May, 1983

181

